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Deference Debate and the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
in Financial Regulation: MetLife v. Financial Stability 
Oversight Council 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd- 
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd- 
Frank”) to reform the financial regulatory system in the United States.1 
One of Dodd-Frank’s primary additions to the financial industry is the 
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC” or “the 
Council”), which is charged with monitoring the financial industry to 
ensure that financial institutions do not pose systemic risk.2 The critical 
regulatory power of FSOC is its ability to designate nonbank financial 
institutions as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (“SIFI”) 
and subject them to increased regulation by the Federal Reserve Board 
(“the Fed”).3 Once designated, a firm may only shed the  SIFI 
designation if it proves that the SIFI designation was “arbitrary and 
capricious.”4 
In December 2014, FSOC voted to designate MetLife, Inc. 
(“MetLife”)5  a SIFI.6 MetLife was the fourth nonbank to be designated  
a SIFI, following American Insurance Group (“AIG”), General Electric 
Capital     Corporation     (“GE”),7     and     Prudential     Financial, Inc. 
 
1. David Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, 
HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (July 7, 2010), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation- 
legislation/ (giving a history of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation). 
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a)–(b) (2015). 
3.   Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 
4.   Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h). 
5. MetLife is a U.S. based, global provider of insurance, annuities, and employee 
benefit programs. See generally About MetLife, METLIFE, https://www.metlife.com/about/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
6. Eric Garcia, MetLife Faces Challenge to Overturn ‘Systemically Important’ 
Designation, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 14, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/metlife-bfaces-challenge-to-overturn-systemically-important-designation-2015-01-13. 
7. On  June  28,  2016,  GE  subsequently  successfully  shed  its  SIFI  designation by 
  
 
 
254 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 21 
(“Prudential”).8 On January 13, 2015, MetLife challenged FSOC’s 
designation in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, arguing that the decision to designate MetLife was “arbitrary 
and capricious.”9 In MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight 
Council,10 the D.C.  District  Court  agreed.11  In  reaching  its 
determination, the court concluded that while MetLife was eligible to be 
designated as a SIFI, FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and capricious 
because it both deviated from its own guidance “without 
acknowledgement or explanation” and also failed to consider the 
regulatory cost that SIFI designation would impose on  MetLife.12  
FSOC appealed the court’s ruling, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit heard oral arguments on October 24, 
2016.13 While possible to frame the Circuit Court’s pending decision in 
terms of the extent of administrative mistakes on FSOC’s part, the 
appellate process has unearthed fundamental debates over the degree of 
deference that should be given to FSOC in its designation analysis as 
well as the role of cost-benefit analysis in FSOC’s methodology.14 
This Note examines the district court’s decision and discusses 
the issues raised on both sides of the appeal. This Note proceeds in five 
parts. Part II describes the purpose of FSOC and its SIFI designation 
process.15 Part III discusses both FSOC’s rationale for designating 
MetLife as a SIFI and the district court’s ruling.16 Part IV details the 
arguments raised on appeal and explores the merits of the arguments.17 
Part  V  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  possible  outcome  of the 
 
liquidating a significant portion of its financial business. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of  
Treas., Financial Stability Oversight Council Announces Rescission of Nonbank Financial 
Company Designation (June 29, 2016). 
8. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Oversight Council 
Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY., (June 29, 2016, 9:48 AM), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank. 
9. See Paige Brewin, MetLife’s SIFI Designation and Appeal, 34 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 435, 440 (2015). 
10.   177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 231 (D.D.C. 2016). 
11. See id. at 230. 
12. Id. 
13. Oral Argument Calendar, U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., https:// 
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/sixtyday.nsf/fullcalendar?OpenView&count=1000 (last 
modified Jan. 20, 2017 5:30 AM). 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
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appeal.18 
 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE CREATION OF 
FSOC 
 
A. Origins of FSOC and Its Purpose 
 
One of the consistent criticisms of federal financial regulation, 
prior to Dodd-Frank, was the fragmentation and “meaningless formal 
separation lines among various segments of the financial industry.”19 
Despite this criticism, Dodd-Frank largely retained the existing 
fragmented regulatory structure of the financial system.20 Instead of 
overhauling the regulatory structure, legislators created FSOC in an 
attempt to identify and combat systemic risk.21 
Dodd-Frank established FSOC with three stated purposes: (1) 
“to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could 
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, 
of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial 
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services 
marketplace”; (2) “to promote market discipline”; and (3) “to respond to 
emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.”22 
There are ten voting members of FSOC, each the head of a 
major regulatory agency, as well as one member appointed by the 
President.23 The members include the Secretary of the Treasury (who 
serves as the Chairperson of the Council), Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of the Currency, 
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Chairperson of 
 
 
18. See infra Part V. 
19. Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act, A New Deal for a New Age?, 15 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 83, 87 (2011) (explaining that the US silo-based regulatory system, where 
financial institutions are place in mutually exclusive regulatory categories, “allows for 
companies to incur high levels of risk hidden from regulators,” as they are restricted to their 
respective regulatory silo). 
20. Id. While the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTC) was eliminated and merged with 
the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), all of the other agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
were left intact. Id. 
21.    Id. at 88–89. 
22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2015). 
23.   Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1). 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission, Chair of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, and the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration 
Board, as well as one member with insurance expertise appointed by the 
President, with advice and consent of the Senate, to serve a six-year 
term.24 Additionally, five nonvoting members serve in an advisory 
capacity.25 
 
B. SIFI Designation Process 
 
Section 113 of Dodd-Frank gives FSOC the ability to designate 
certain nonbank financial companies as systemically important, and 
subject them to regulation (or heightened regulation) by the  Fed.26 
These regulations, new for nonbank companies,27 can include risk-based 
capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, resolution 
plan and credit exposure report requirements, concentration limits, a 
contingent capital requirement, enhanced public disclosures, short-term 
debt limits, and overall risk management requirements.28 
Under Dodd-Frank, a nonbank financial institution is defined as 
a company that is incorporated or organized under United States law  
and “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”29 There are two 
independent  tests  under  Section  102  of  Dodd-Frank  that  determine 
 
 
24. Id. 
25. Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2). The nonvoting members are: the 
Director of the Office of Financial Research; the Director of the Federal Insurance Office; a 
State insurance commissioner, to be designated by a selection process determined by the 
State insurance commissioners; a State banking supervisor to be designated by a selection 
process determined by the State banking supervisors; and a State securities commissioner or 
an officer performing like function, to be designated by a selection process determined by 
such State securities commissioners.  Dodd-Frank § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2). 
26.   Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 
27.  Though the Fed already regulated banks and bank holding companies, this section   
of Dodd-Frank marks a significant expansion of the Fed’s powers by including additional 
nonbanks in its charge. See Bernard Shull, The Impact of Financial Reform on Fed. Reserve 
Autonomy 7 (Levy Economics Inst. Working Paper No. 735, 2012), http:// 
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_735.pdf (“On the recognition that the financial crisis 
emanated, in part, from the risky activities of investment banks and insurance companies, 
the Fed is also charged with supervising nonbank financial institutions designated as 
systemically important (SIFIs) by the FSOC.”). 
28.   Dodd-Frank § 115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325(b). 
29.   Dodd-Frank § 102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(4)(B)(i)–(ii). 
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whether a nonbank financial institution meets the “predominantly 
engaged in financial activities” qualification.30 Under the first test, at 
least 85% of the company’s consolidated annual gross revenues must be 
“derived” from activities that are “financial in nature.”31 Under  the 
second test, at least 85% of the company’s consolidated assets must be 
“related to activities that are financial in nature.”32 Section 4(k) of the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, defines what constitutes activities 
that are financial in nature.33 
When evaluating a nonbank financial institution for potential 
SIFI designation, Dodd-Frank requires FSOC to consider ten statutory 
factors.34 Additionally, there is a catch-all provision, which requires 
FSOC to consider “any other risk-related factors the Council deems 
appropriate.”35 In 2012, FSOC issued its interpretive Guidance for 
Nonbank Financial Company Designations (“Guidance”),36 which 
compressed the ten statutory factors (and the additional risk-related 
catch-all factor) into six categories: (1) interconnectedness; (2) 
substitutability; (3) size; (4) leverage; (5) liquidity risk and maturity 
mismatch; and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny.37 The first three of these 
categories—size,   substitutability,   and   interconnectedness—serve  to 
 
30.   Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(A)–(B). 
31.   Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(A). 
32.   Dodd-Frank §102, 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a)(6)(B). 
33.   Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2015). 
34. Dodd-Frank §113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2). The factors are: (A) “the extent of the 
leverage of the company”; (B) the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of 
the company”; (C) “the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the 
company with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding 
companies”; (D) the importance of the company as a source of credit for households, 
businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United 
States financial system”; (E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low- 
income, minority, or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such 
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities”; (F) the extent to 
which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the extent to which 
ownership of assets under management is diffuse”; (G) “the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company”; (H) “the 
degree to which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary financial regulatory 
agencies”; (I) “the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company”; and (J) “the 
amount and types of the liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on short- 
term funding.”  Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2). 
35. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (listing this factor as factor (K) in the 
legislation). 
36. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial 
Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310, App. A (2016). 
37. Id. 
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gauge the potential impact of a nonbank financial company’s financial 
distress on the overall economy.38 The second three—leverage, liquidity 
risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny—serve to 
examine the susceptibility of a company to material financial distress.39 
In its Guidance, FSOC related that “material financial distress” exists 
when a firm is in “imminent danger of insolvency or defaulting on its 
financial obligations.”40 
FSOC utilized this six-factor analytical framework to develop 
two independently sufficient standards through which it can designate a 
nonbank financial company as a SIFI.41 Both standards require a two- 
thirds Council vote, including an affirmative vote from the Chairperson 
of the Council.42 The first determination standard is satisfied “if  
material financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose 
a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”43 The second 
determination standard is satisfied if “the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the 
nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the financial stability 
of the United States.”44 While these standards are independent of one 
another, FSOC noted that there could be significant overlap between the 
outcome of an evaluation under each standard.45 
Under the two determination standards, a “threat to financial 
stability” occurs when there is an “impairment of financial 
intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be 
sufficiently severe to inflict significant damage on the broader 
economy.”46 FSOC identified three channels through which a nonbank 
financial  company’s  material  financial  distress  could  be  transmitted 
 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41.   12 C.F.R. §1310, App. A. 
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2015). 
43.    12 C.F.R. §1310, App. A. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. (“The Council expects that there likely will be significant overlap between the 
outcome of an assessment of a nonbank financial company under the First and Second 
Determination Standards, because, in many cases, a nonbank financial company that could 
pose a threat to U.S. financial stability because of the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of its activities could also pose a threat to U.S. 
financial stability if it were to experience material financial distress.”). 
46. Id. 
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through the markets or to other firms, and thus cause damage to the 
overall economy: (1) exposure, where “a nonbank financial company’s 
creditors, counterparties, investors, or other market participants have 
exposure to the nonbank financial company that is significant enough to 
materially impair those creditors, counterparties, investors, or other 
market participants”; (2) asset liquidation, where a “nonbank financial 
company holds assets that, if liquidated quickly, would cause a fall in 
asset prices and thereby significantly disrupt trading or funding in key 
markets or cause significant losses or funding problems for other firms 
with similar holdings”; and (3) critical function or service, where “a 
nonbank financial company is no longer able or willing to provide a 
critical function or service that is relied upon by market participants and 
for which there are no ready substitutes.”47 
The only legal recourse for this process offered to SIFI- 
designated nonbank financial companies under Dodd-Frank48 is to 
challenge FSOC’s final determination within thirty days in either the 
United States district court for the judicial district in which the home 
office of the company is located or the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.49 In order for a court to rescind the SIFI 
designation, the designated company must prove that FSOC’s final 
determination was “arbitrary and capricious.”50 
 
III. METLIFE’S DESIGNATION AND THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT’S RULING 
 
A. FSOC Designation of MetLife and Rationale 
 
On July 16, 2013, the Council notified MetLife that it was being 
considered  for  SIFI  designation.51    On  October  3,  2014,  MetLife 
 
47. Id. 
48. Companies are notified when they are under review for potential SIFI designation, 
and can request an oral or written hearing during the process to argue against their 
designation. See Financial Stability Oversight Council FAQ’s, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/nonbank- 
faq.aspx#8 (last updated Feb. 14, 2015). However, once designated, they  must  either 
comply with FSOC or utilize the statutory legal recourse to shed SIFI designation. Id. 
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
§ 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h) (2015). 
50. Id. 
51. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BASIS FOR THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, 
INC. 2 (2014) [hereinafter FINAL DETERMINATION], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/ 
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requested and FSOC granted, a hearing regarding its potential 
designation.52 After reviewing and considering evidence from the 
hearing, meetings with MetLife representatives,53 and additional 
materials sent to the Council by MetLife, FSOC issued a report (“Final 
Determination”) that designated MetLife a SIFI on December 18, 2014, 
by a vote of nine to one, with Roy Woodall Jr.54 as the lone dissent.55 
FSOC designated MetLife a SIFI under the first determination 
standard.56 The Council’s basis for designating MetLife revolved  
around the three risk transmission channels set forth in its Guidance: (1) 
MetLife’s exposure to counterparties, creditors, investors, and other 
market participants; (2) the possibility that if MetLife liquidated its 
assets, it could trigger market disruptions or difficulties for firms with 
similar holdings; and (3) MetLife’s inability to provide a critical service 
or function relied upon by other firms.57 The designation did not imply 
that MetLife was in any imminent danger of financial insolvency.58 
Rather, the SIFI designation was taken as a precautionary measure, due 
to FSOC’s opinion that material financial distress at MetLife, were it to 
occur, could pose a threat to the broader economy.59 
 
1. MetLife’s Exposure to Other Market Participants 
 
In its Final Determination, the Council expressed concern with 
the fact that large financial intermediaries have significant exposure to 
MetLife “arising from the company’s institutional products and capital 
markets activities, such as the funding agreements, general and separate 
 
designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf. 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. Id. at 2. Staff of Council members met with MetLife representatives twelve times 
between September of 2013 and September of 2014. Id. 
54. Financial Stability Oversight Council, S. Roy Woodall Jr., U.S. DEPT. OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/roy_woodall.aspx 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2012, 9:53 AM) (stating that Roy Woodall was nominated by 
President Barack Obama to serve on FSOC as the independent voting member with 
insurance expertise). 
55. See Brewin, supra note 9, at 439. 
56. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 4. 
57. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 15. 
58. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
59. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16 (“The Council’s final determination 
does not constitute a conclusion that MetLife is experiencing, or is likely to experience, 
material financial distress. Rather, the Council has determined that material  financial 
distress at the company, if it were to occur, could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.”). 
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account [guaranteed investment contracts], pension closeouts, securities 
lending agreements, and outstanding indebtedness.”60 Another concern 
cited under the exposure transmission channel was the potential for 
MetLife’s substantial number of worldwide policyholders61 to sustain 
serious losses in the event of MetLife’s material financial distress.62 
 
2. MetLife’s Asset Liquidation 
 
The Council noted that if MetLife were to suffer material 
financial distress, it could be forced to liquidate assets to meet its 
financial obligations.63 Further, the Council noted that MetLife has 
significant products that could be threatened by non-renewal or 
termination by counterparties.64 Additionally, a substantial portion of  
the company’s insurance liabilities can be surrendered in exchange for 
cash value, and policy owners may borrow against their outstanding 
policies.65 FSOC noted that MetLife’s leverage, deemed higher than 
most of its peers, could instigate a large-scale forced liquidation of its 
assets.66 In turn, such a liquidation of assets could disrupt trading and 
impair market functioning, thus straining the overall economy.67 
 
3. Ability to Perform a Critical Function or Service 
 
While the Council noted that MetLife was the leader in the life 
and health insurance market in the United States,68 it expressed the 
opinion that the market was competitive enough for other participants to 
absorb the impact of MetLife’s potential failure.69 The Council stated: 
“MetLife’s share in these generally fragmented and competitive markets 
 
60. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
61. MetLife  has  approximately  100  million  policy  holders. FINAL DETERMINATION, 
supra note 51, at 16. 
62. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
63. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
64. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
65. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 4. 
66. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
67. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 16. 
68. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25. The Council noted that MetLife’s 
market share in that segment was approximately 15%. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 
51, at 25. Further, MetLife was cited as a significant participant in the corporate benefit 
funding and annuity product markets. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25. 
69. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25. 
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do not appear large enough to cause a significant disruption in the 
provision of services if the company were to experience material 
financial distress.”70 
 
B. MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council—The 
District Court’s Ruling 
 
Following its designation, MetLife utilized its legal remedy 
under Dodd-Frank and filed a complaint arguing that FSOC’s Final 
Determination was arbitrary and capricious.71 The District Court for the 
District of Columbia ruled in MetLife’s favor on March 30, 2016, 
rescinding MetLife’s SIFI designation.72 
The court determined that MetLife was eligible for designation 
as a SIFI under the statutory test established by Dodd-Frank,73 however, 
it held that FSOC’s designation was arbitrary and capricious in two 
ways: (1) by violating its own guidance in failing to assess MetLife’s 
susceptibility to material financial distress before addressing the effects 
of such distress, as well as by inconsistently applying its own 
promulgated determination standards; and (2) by failing to consider the 
regulatory cost to MetLife prior to making its designation.74 Following 
the court’s ruling, FSOC appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.75 
 
1. FSOC’s Failure to Adhere to Its Own Guidance 
 
The district court criticized the Council’s deviance from its own 
guidance in MetLife’s designation in two ways.76 First, the court 
reasoned that FSOC’s Guidance for designation divided six categories 
of analysis into two distinct groups.77   As discussed earlier, the first 
 
70. FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 51, at 25. 
71. Complaint at *1–3, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. 
Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2015) (No. 15–45). 
72. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 
2016). 
73.    Id. at 230. 
74.    Id. at 233–239. 
75. Chris Bruce, MetLife Too-Big-To-Fail Case Set For October Argument, 107 
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 08 at 286 (Aug. 29, 2016). 
76. MetLife, Inc., 177 F.Supp.3d at 233–239. 
77. See id. 
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group—size, substitutability, and interconnectedness—was intended to 
consider the possible impact of the nonbank financial company’s 
financial distress on the U.S. economy.78 The second group: leverage, 
liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulator structure 
was intended to “determine the susceptibility of a nonbank financial 
company to financial distress.”79 MetLife’s argument, which the court 
agreed with, was that FSOC failed to address MetLife’s vulnerability to 
financial distress before addressing the possible effects of that distress.80 
In other words, FSOC used all six categories to examine the impact that 
MetLife’s failure could have on the broader economy, instead of using 
the first group to discuss the impact and the second to discuss MetLife’s 
susceptibility to financial distress.81 The court noted that FSOC’s 
Guidance established that only the second group of analytical categories 
was intended to examine the impact of a company’s material financial 
distress on the broader economy.82 However, the court reasoned that 
FSOC’s Final Determination regarding MetLife was contradictory to  
the Guidance, because it specified that all six categories were meant to 
weigh the potential effects of a company’s material financial distress.83 
The court found the deviation between FSOC’s Guidance and its Final 
Determination “undeniably inconsistent” and thus rendered this aspect 
of MetLife’s designation as arbitrary and capricious.84 
Second, the court held that the Council inconsistently applied its 
own methodology in its Final Determination by combining its two 
different determination standards.85 The court remarked that FSOC 
merely evaluated MetLife’s interconnectedness with other actors in the 
market, and refrained from determining any possible loss.86 The court 
further   explained   that   FSOC’s   analysis   amounted   to   merely   a 
 
 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. ROBERTO J. GONZALEZ ET AL., PAUL WEISS LLP, CLIENT ALERT: RESISTANCE IS NOT 
ALWAYS FUTILE: THE D.C. DISTRICT COURT DEALS FSOC A SIGNIFICANT BLOW BY 
RESCINDING    METLIFE’S    DESIGNATION    (2016), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/ 
litigation/insurance/publications/resistance-is-not-always-futile-the-dc-district-court-deals- 
fsoc.aspx?id=21716. 
81. MetLife, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 233–35. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85.    Id. at 238. 
86. Id. 
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summation of MetLife’s market exposures without considering 
mitigating factors, and that it assumed that losses relating to those 
exposures would inflict significant damage on the market and the 
broader U.S. economy.87 In other words, the court found that FSOC’s 
reasoning was in line with the second determination standard, where a 
company’s nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, 
or mix of those activities alone was enough to pose a threat to the 
financial stability of the United States.88 However, FSOC invoked the 
first determination in its analysis, where it must be established that a 
nonbank financial institution’s material financial distress could pose a 
threat to the broader economy.89 Regarding FSOC’s deviance from its 
own guidance, the court stated that FSOC was required to either 
maintain its two promulgated standards, or explain its deviance from 
them.90 Having done neither, the court found that FSOC’s reversed use 
of its own standards was arbitrary and capricious.91 
 
2.  Failure to Consider Cost 
 
In addition to finding that the Council’s two deviations from its 
own guidance was arbitrary and capricious, the court offered one further 
mistake on FSOC’s part: failure to consider the cost to MetLife of its 
SIFI designation.92 The district court relied on the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Environmental Protection 
Agency93 in determining that cost was a relevant factor for an 
administrative agency to consider when deciding whether to regulate an 
entity.94 The court noted that  although  cost  was  not  explicitly 
mentioned as a factor in the Dodd-Frank legislation pertaining to SIFI 
designation,95 regulation is not “appropriate” if it  does  significantly 
more  harm  than  good,  and  thus  a  cost-benefit  analysis  must  be 
 
87. Id. 
88.    Id. at 238. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Michigan v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
94. MetLife, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 239. 
95. However, Dodd-Frank does require a consideration of “all appropriate risk  
factors.”   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
§ 113, 12 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(K)(2015). 
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conducted when designating SIFIs.96 
After determining that cost was an applicable factor for the 
Council to consider when deciding to designate a company, the court 
deemed the Council’s decision to ignore cost arbitrary and capricious.97 
In reaching this determination, the court noted Dodd-Frank’s 
“command” to consider all appropriate risk factors in Section 
113(a)(2)(K).98 The court’s analysis centered on MetLife’s argument, 
which FSOC failed to address, that imposing billions of dollars in cost 
due to increased regulation could actually leave the company more 
vulnerable to material financial distress.99 In this regard, the court held 
that because FSOC did not consider cost as part of its designation 
calculus, determining whether the designation caused more harm than 
good was “impossible,” and thus the Final Determination was arbitrary 
and capricious.100 
 
3.  Pending Appeal 
 
FSOC appealed the ruling, claiming the court’s reasoning was 
“profoundly mistaken,” and that the decision left “one of the largest, 
most complex, and most interconnected financial companies in the 
country” without vital regulatory oversight deemed necessary by 
Congress.101 The D.C. Circuit heard arguments on October 24, 2016.102 
The three judge panel selected to hear the arguments included Judges  
Sri Srinivasan and Patricia Millett, both appointed by President Barack 
Obama, as well as Judge Raymond Randolph, who was appointed by 
President George W. Bush.103 
 
 
 
 
 
96. MetLife, Inc. 177 F.Supp.3d at 240. 
97.    Id. at 242. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Brief of Appellant at *1–2, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 
16-5086, 2016 WL 3356866  (C.A.D.C. June 16, 2016). 
102. Oral Argument Calendar, supra note 13. 
103. Andrew Ackerman, Majority of Judges in MetLife Appeal Appointed by Obama, 
WALL ST. J., (Sept. 26, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/majority-of-judges- 
in-metlife-appeal-appointed-by-obama-1474916670. 
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IV. THE CRITICAL ISSUES UNDERLYING METLIFE V. FSOC ON APPEAL 
 
One possible view of the district court’s decision is that FSOC 
committed an “administrative foot-fault” in its analysis by mixing its 
determination standards.104 Under this view, FSOC could simply rework 
its analysis and re-designate MetLife using a more stringent analysis.105 
However, the issues raised on appeal suggest that there are fundamental 
questions underlying FSOC’s designation framework, including the  
level of deference that FSOC is to be allowed in its designation analysis, 
as well as the role of cost-benefit analysis in FSOC’s judgments.106 The 
debate over deference as well as the role of cost-benefit analysis, and  
the merits of the competing arguments, are explored further in this Part. 
 
A. The Level of Deference Shown to FSOC 
 
One of the key issues that arises from this case is the level of 
deference that courts should give to FSOC in its designation analysis.107 
Deference to FSOC manifests itself in two specific ways: (1) the extent 
FSOC is required to assess the degree of MetLife’s vulnerability to 
material financial distress108 and (2) the extent to which FSOC must 
assess the impact of MetLife’s distress on the broader economy.109 
 
1. Extent of Vulnerability Analysis Required by FSOC 
 
The regulatory view, espoused by FSOC in its appellate brief, is 
that neither Dodd-Frank nor the Guidance requires FSOC to assess the 
probability of a company’s vulnerability to financial distress or  
losses.110 FSOC argued that the statutory language in Dodd-Frank was 
created with the intent of regulating in light of the “inherent uncertainty 
of financial crises” and that the statute only requires an assertion of 
 
 
104. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
105. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
106. See Chris Bruce, MetLife-FSOC On Appeal: Four Issues to Watch, 107 Banking 
Rep. (BNA) No. 14 at 507 (Oct. 17, 2016). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Reply Brief for Appellant, at *11–13, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council, No. 16-5086, 2016 WL 3356866 (C.A.D.C. Sept. 09, 2016). 
110.    Id. at *23. 
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whether a company’s material financial distress could pose a threat to 
the economy, not necessarily a detailed forecast of an impending 
company collapse and its effects.111 
Similarly, the FSOC articulated that its Guidance did not 
establish that it would examine the probability that a company would 
experience financial distress.112 Rather, the Guidance categories are 
“interrelated” and that the three vulnerability categories created by the 
Guidance are intended to “shed light on the effects that distress could 
have on the company,” and how the company might respond if faced 
with material financial distress.113 
In contrast, MetLife argued that FSOC, in its Final Designation, 
violated its Guidance and Dodd-Frank’s statutory framework by failing 
to assess MetLife’s vulnerability to material financial distress.114 
MetLife claimed that FSOC made an “unambiguous commitment” in 
both its Final Determination and interpretive Guidance to assess the 
likelihood of the potential SIFI experiencing material financial 
distress.115 
Furthermore, MetLife insisted that Section 113(a)(2) of Dodd- 
Frank requires an assessment of a company’s susceptibility to material 
financial distress.116 FSOC is required to consider vulnerability as an 
“appropriate risk-related factor” under Section 113(a)(2)(K); it would be 
unreasonable for FSOC to subject a company to the costs and burdens 
 
111. Id. (“[A]lthough the Council’s analysis was based on extensive qualitative and 
quantitative analyses, the Council recognized that ‘financial crises can be hard to predict and 
can have far reaching and unanticipated consequences.” The statute directs the Council to 
determine whether a company’s material financial distress ‘could pose a threat,’ and does 
not contemplate that he Council will forecast the collapse of the next financial bubble and 
predict the specific effects it will have on particular companies.”). Reply Brief for 
Appellant, supra note 109, at *41–44. 
112. FSOC noted that the district court misinterpreted the guidance as requiring FSOC  
to conduct a separate analysis regarding the likelihood of financial distress at MetLife. Id. 
FSOC stated that “While the Council’s guidance identified specific issues that it intended to 
address in considering the statutory factors, it never stated that it would perform a separate 
analysis of the type envisioned by the district court.” Id. 
113. Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *29. 
114. Brief for Appellee at *23, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
201 No. 16-5086 (C.A.D.C. Aug. 15, 2016). 
115. Id. MetLife’s appellate brief also charged FSOC with revisionism, stating that its 
discussion of leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory  
scrutiny in its initial appellate brief was not intended to be analyzed regarding the effects of 
a company’s financial distress on other market participants and broader economy.   Id. at 
*26. 
116.    Id. at *29. 
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of enhanced federal oversight in the absence of a plausible risk that the 
company will actually experience material financial distress.117 
Finally, MetLife asserted that FSOC improperly assumed that 
distress at MetLife was more severe than the definition of material 
financial distress in its interpretive Guidance and  Final 
Determination.118  Essentially, MetLife posited that FSOC abandoned  
its own definition of material financial distress, defined in its final rule 
and interpretive Guidance as “imminent danger of insolvency,” and 
instead assuming more dire levels of distress.119 MetLife argued that 
FSOC “moved the goalposts” in order to craft an effective SIFI 
designation for MetLife.120 
 
2. Failure to Quantify How MetLife’s Distress Could Impact the 
Broader Economy 
 
Keeping with its statutory requirements and Guidance, FSOC’s 
argument is that it assessed whether MetLife’s material financial  
distress could pose a threat to the overall U.S. financial  system.121 
FSOC focused on the ways that MetLife’s distress could impact the 
economy.122 FSOC contended that the district court “did not question” 
FSOC’s conclusion that MetLife’s material financial distress could pose 
a threat to U.S. financial stability, but faulted the regulatory body for  
not predicting “what the losses would be” or “how the market would 
destabilize” as a consequence of MetLife’s distress.123 FSOC claimed 
that its Guidance “contains no suggestions” that it must delineate the 
specific causes and effects of MetLife’s failure.124 Furthermore, FSOC 
suggested that its analysis went beyond a summation of  MetLife’s 
assets and exposures as found by the district court.125 
MetLife  alternatively  argued  that  FSOC’s  final  designation 
 
117. Id. at 30. 
118. Id. at 31. 
119. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32. 
120. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32. 
121. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *39. 
122. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *41–44 (noting that “Metlife could 
destabilize the financial system” through exposure transmission and asset liquidation 
channels). 
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *46. 
124. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *47. 
125. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *47. 
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analysis regarding exposure and asset liquidation was inconsistent with 
its interpretive Guidance and Dodd-Frank.126  In  the  Final 
Determination and interpretive Guidance, FSOC stated that material 
financial distress at a nonbank financial company could pose a systemic 
risk to U.S. financial stability only if “an impairment of financial 
intermediation or of financial market functioning” was sufficiently 
“severe to inflict significant damage on the broader economy.”127 
According to MetLife, FSOC abandoned this analytical standard by 
simply tallying raw exposures and total assets while refusing to assess 
potential losses from those exposures.128 Further, MetLife insisted that  
in tallying, FSOC relied on unjustified assumptions and guesswork, 
rather than evidence-based judgments.129 
 
B. The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in FSOC’s Designation 
Process 
 
MetLife’s position regarding the cost-benefit aspect of the 
decision is that FSOC is required to consider the costs of designation 
under the final catch-all risk factor established in Dodd-Frank.130 
MetLife’s argument for inclusion is that imposing the increased capital 
requirements could weaken the company, thus rendering it more 
susceptible to material financial distress.131 Likening  the  catch-all 
factor to a similar provision in Michigan v. Environmental Protection 
Agency,132 MetLife contends that a cost consideration falls under the 
“risk-related factor” penumbra of Dodd-Frank’s statutory factors in 
Section 113(a)(2) and thus merits a requirement that FSOC weigh the 
costs and the benefits of designation.133 
The regulatory stance, according to FSOC, is that the ten 
statutory factors established in Dodd-Frank do not relate to the costs 
 
126. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32. 
127. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *32. 
128. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *33. 
129. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *34. 
130. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *51. 
131. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *54. 
132. In Michigan, the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Clean Air Act that 
directs the EPA to regulate power plants if it “finds such regulation is appropriate and 
necessary” implies a requirement to weigh the costs of regulation versus the benefits. 
Michigan v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
133. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at *54. 
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that designation may impose on the company, because the factors are 
only meant to weigh whether a company’s material financial distress 
could pose a threat to the country’s financial stability.134 Further, the 
statute grants FSOC broad designation authority, and therefore it only 
needs to consider risk-related factors that it deems appropriate.135 
Additionally, the regulatory argument is that Michigan itself is 
not directly applicable to the cost-benefit debate in this case.136 FSOC 
contends that the district court misapplied the rule in Michigan, because 
the underlying statute in that case did not indicate the types of factors 
that should guide the EPA’s decision-making process, whereas Dodd- 
Frank explicitly lists the factors that are meant to guide FSOC in its 
regulatory mission.137 Additionally, as noted above, FSOC argues that 
even if regulatory cost could be considered under the catch-all statutory 
factor, Dodd-Frank bestowed discretion as to whether that factor should 
be “deemed appropriate” by FSOC.138 
 
C. Analysis of the Competing Views 
 
1. Competing Interpretations of FSOC’s Guidance 
 
One key turning point in evaluating the validity of both FSOC 
and MetLife’s argument is the extent to which FSOC’s Interpretive 
Guidance and Dodd-Frank’s statutory framework requires a 
vulnerability assessment.139 A compelling argument, filed in an amici 
curiae brief, is that the district court misinterpreted FSOC’s reference to 
vulnerability in its interpretive Guidance as a requirement that it 
consider  the  likelihood  of  a  firm’s  failure.140     The  reference  to 
 
 
134. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *51. 
135. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52. 
136. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52. 
137. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *52. 
138. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *53. 
139. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Insurance and Financial Regulation in Support   
of Appellant and Reversal, at *4, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council (2016) 
(No. 16-5086) WL 3453715 (C.A.D.C. June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellant]. 
140. Id. (“The court further erred by misinterpreting the Council’s reference to 
“vulnerability” in its interpretive guidance to create a requirement that the Council consider 
the likelihood of a firm’s financial failure – even though such a requirement is manifestly 
inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank Act’s scheme for nonbank financial companies.”). 
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vulnerability does not necessarily mandate that FSOC undertake an 
exhaustive vulnerability analysis.141 Furthermore, one could argue that 
when clarifying the ambiguity in the relevant regulatory guidance, the 
agency—not the courts—should be afforded deference as to the correct 
reading.142 This pro-regulatory view encompasses a  “well-settled” 
aspect of administrative law.143 According to one law professor, the 
district court contradicted this aspect of administrative law by favoring 
its own understanding by giving its understanding of FSOC’s Guidance 
to FSOC’s own interpretation.144 
Finally, while a quantification of MetLife’s vulnerability to 
material financial distress would certainly be useful, it might not  
actually be possible.145 In an amicus brief on appeal, the Scholars of 
Insurance and Financial Regulation group noted that there was no 
“plausible way” for FSOC to meaningfully quantify the likelihood that 
material financial distress at MetLife could impair market  
functioning.146 Such a calculation would require a prediction of the 
likelihood that a systemic crisis would occur at a future point.147 The 
amicus brief noted that this would be impossible, and thus all that can  
be required in FSOC’s analysis is whether there is some risk of a 
systemic crisis.148 
However, amicus briefs filed in support of MetLife’s position 
note that there are two methods that could help with a quantitative 
vulnerability  assessment:  stress  testing  and  value-at-risk  models.149 
 
 
141. In other words, FSOC might only be required to address vulnerability, rather than 
conduct a thorough assessment. Brief for Appellant, supra note 101, at *37. 
142. Bruce, supra note 106. 
143. Bruce, supra note 106. 
144. Bruce, supra note 106 (quoting Saule Omarova, professor of law at Cornell 
University). 
145. Jared Bernstein, Financial Reform and MetLife: The Judge Got it (Mostly) Wrong, 
WASH. POST. (Apr. 12, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/ 
12/financial-reform-and-metlife-the-judge-got-it-mostly-wrong/?utm_term=.a56ef2c51e4f. 
146. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 139, at *4. 
147. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 139, at *12. 
148. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 139, at *12 (“[I]f there were enough information 
to permit an observer to predict that a crisis would emerge next year, then that crisis would 
either be (1) avoidable, in which case market actors would avoid it; or (2) unavoidable, in 
which case market actors would immediately react and the crisis would occur now. All we 
can say in advance is that there is some risk of a systemic crisis.”) 
149. Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in Fin. Regulation in Support of Appellee 
and Affirmance at *25–26, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086, 
2016  WL  4440274  (C.A.D.C.  Aug.  22,  2016)  [hereinafter  Brief  of  Amici  Curiae  for 
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Stress testing, notably used on banks and bank holding companies, 
provides information on expected losses to a company over a certain 
time period, which could point to a workable estimate of a nonbank 
company’s vulnerability to material financial distress.150 Additionally, 
value-at-risk is a method of statistically modeling the risk of 
investments, but estimating how such investments might lose value 
under various market conditions and time periods.151 The methods 
complement each other, and could be used by FSOC to measure  
targeted companies’ risk exposure and vulnerability in a designation 
analysis.152 Thus, these two methods provide a compelling counter to  
the regulatory argument that FSOC is not capable of undertaking a 
quantitative assessment of a company’s vulnerability to financial 
distress.153 
 
2.  The Cost-Benefit Debate 
 
While Michigan presents a compelling case to read in a cost- 
benefit requirement to the FSOC-relevant Dodd-Frank provisions, it is 
distinguishable from MetLife in one vital respect.154 The provision in 
Dodd-Frank explicitly listed the factors that are meant to guide FSOC in 
its designation process, all of which revolved around risk and did not 
involve cost.155 In contrast, the underlying statute in Michigan was not 
nearly as specific with its guiding factors.156 Thus, it is possible that 
Michigan might not be directly relevant to MetLife’s decision because 
the Dodd-Frank factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list of the 
factors appropriate for designating SIFIs.157 Even if Michigan is not 
distinguishable, the viability of conducting a cost-benefit analysis in 
 
 
Appellee]. 
150. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *24–26. 
151. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *25. 
152. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 149, at *25-26. 
153. A collection of law professors noted that had FSOC used the two methodologies,  
“it could not have made the determination that it did.” Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, 
supra note 149, at *6. 
154. Bruce, supra note 106. 
155. Bruce, supra note 106. 
156. Bruce, supra note 106. 
157. Gillian Metzger, a professor of law at Columbia Law School, noted that the D.C. 
Circuit will likely grapple with how to read and apply Michigan v. EPA to MetLife’s case. 
Bruce, supra note 106. 
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systemic risk scenarios is a legitimate issue.158 
There is also considerable debate as to whether a cost-benefit 
analysis is actually possible for FSOC to calculate.159 One barrier to 
creating such an analysis is the inability of regulators to accurately 
predict costs to firms because the actual act of designation creates 
variables in how firms operate.160 Firms are not static entities; they 
actively manage their capital and operations in response to regulation.161 
For example, GE unloaded over $200 billion in lending assets in 
response to its SIFI designation, which subsequently led FSOC to 
rescind its designation of the company.162 In fact, MetLife itself 
separated its U.S. retail segment from the rest of the company prior to 
the district court’s decision, partially to avoid the regulatory impact of 
increased federal regulation as a result of SIFI designation.163 While it 
might be possible to predict the costs of a financial institution in 
carrying an increased amount of capital,164 the prior examples illustrate 
that companies are constantly evolving, and FSOC’s ability  to 
accurately predict costs of regulation on these malleable entities might 
not be as clear cut as it would appear.165 
Second, even if an accurate cost of imposed regulation on a 
nonbank financial company could be calculated, the benefits side of a 
cost-benefit equation would be difficult to ascertain.166 In this case, the 
avoidance of a financial recession167 would be the benefit of 
designation.168 Because financial recessions are statistically unlikely to 
 
158. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
159. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
160. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
161. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
162. See Rick Clough, GE Says Too-Big-to-Fail Exit Puts Stamp of Approval on 
Overhaul, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016- 
06-29/ge-wins-regulatory-approval-to-shed-too-big-to-fail-designation (explaining that GE 
was able to shed its SIFI label by unloading businesses such as vehicle fleet financing, 
commercial real estate restaurant lending, and online banking, and only retaining financial 
units that support GE’s manufacturing operations). 
163. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
164. Bernstein, supra note 145. 
165. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
166. Bernstein, supra note 145. 
167. The consequence of a failing SIFI, in a worst-case scenario, would be severe 
market failure or recession; thus, the ultimate benefit of designation is preventing the failure 
of a SIFI and a resulting recession.  Bernstein, supra note 143. 
168. Bernstein, supra note 145. Jared Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget 
and  Policy  Priorities,  noted  that  conducting  a  cost-benefit  analysis  would  be  a “highly 
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occur, yet significantly impact the broader economy, accurately 
predicting or calculating the likelihood and effect of their occurrence is 
exceedingly difficult.169  Further, other aspects of a recession, such as  
the long-term unemployment effects, as well as the effect on 
homeowners losing their homes, are nearly impossible to establish.170 
Thus, while the cost side of a cost-benefit analysis might theoretically  
be possible, it would be frustratingly difficult for FSOC to quantify or 
otherwise measure the beneficial effects of SIFI designation.171 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
While possible to view the court’s ruling as a simple technical 
decision based on FSOC’s failure to adhere to its own interpretive 
Guidance, the decision raises substantive and intricate questions on 
appeal.172 First, there is an important dialogue regarding the flexibility 
that FSOC should be given regarding its decision-making process.173 In 
general, FSOC should be given leeway in interpreting and applying its 
own Guidance in accordance with standard administrative law 
principles.174 However, in this case, the lack of clarity between FSOC’s 
Final Determination and its Guidance regarding vulnerability 
assessments goes beyond this standard deference.175 If  nonbank 
companies are to be subject to designation as SIFIs and increased 
regulation, the Guidance promulgated by FSOC should provide clear 
standards as to how exactly the risk factors in Dodd-Frank will trigger 
this SIFI designation.176 As it stands, FSOC’s Guidance seems  to 
require it to assess a potential SIFI’s vulnerability to material distress; 
thus, FSOC must either update its Guidance to incorporate its current 
 
unrealistic endeavor.”  Id; see also GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
169. Bernstein, supra note 145. 
170. Bernstein, supra note 145. 
171. Bernstein, supra note 145. 
172. See Norbert Michel, MetLife Wins First Legal Challenge To SIFI Process, Still 
Need To Get Rid Of FSOC, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
norbertmichel/2016/04/18/metlife-wins-first-legal-challenge-to-sifi-process-still-need-to- 
get-rid-of-fsoc/#29c765c171c5 (explaining that while MetLife may have won the case on 
technical grounds, the ruling means that FSOC will now be burdened with much more 
stringent analytical requirement). 
173. Bruce, supra note 106. 
174. Bruce, supra note 106. 
175. Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellee, supra note 147, at *31. 
176. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
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interpretation or utilize some sort of methodology, such as stress testing 
or value-at-risk models, to assess vulnerability.177 
Second, the cost-benefit requirement debate, highlighted by the 
district court’s opinion, also presents a question of the role of cost- 
benefit analysis in FSOC’s regulatory methodology.178 Michigan  is 
likely distinguishable from this case because Dodd-Frank lists the 
factors that FSOC must consider, with the catch-all factor applicable 
only at FSOC’s discretion.179 This directly contrasts with the relevant 
statutory language in Michigan, which requires the EPA to consider all 
“appropriate” factors.180 This distinction, coupled with the difficulties 
present in calculating the costs versus the benefits of designation,181 
likely renders null the cost-benefit requirement imposed by the district 
court.182 
The outcome of this appeal also rests within a larger context of 
the debate over the role and scale of regulators and the deference judges 
ought to give to federal financial regulators.183 The fact that two of the 
three judges selected to sit on the panel for the D.C. Circuit’s hearing 
were appointed by President Obama does not bode well for MetLife and 
its appeal.184 Edward Mills, an analyst at investment bank FBR & Co., 
stated that the panel was a “bad draw” for MetLife, opining that the two 
judges appointed by President Obama are likely to be more deferential 
to FSOC and the government’s scope of authority than the district 
court.185 However, the election of President Donald J. Trump looms 
large over this matter: FSOC is reportedly an aspect of Dodd-Frank that 
the present administration is considering eliminating entirely.186 Thus, 
the  debate  over  MetLife’s  designation  may  prove  to  be  a  moot 
 
177. GONZALEZ, supra note 80. 
178. Bernstein, supra note 145 (stating that those familiar with the legal issues 
surrounding this aspect of the judgment deem the aspect unlikely to survive the appeal). 
179. Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *24. 
180. Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at *24. 
181. See supra Part IV.C. 
182. See GONZALEZ, supra note 80 (finding that the mechanics of requiring a cost- 
benefit analysis under Dodd-Frank would leave an “open question” to regulators). 
183. Bruce, supra note 106. 
184. Ackerman, supra note 103. 
185. Ackerman, supra note 103. Further, Robert Jackson of Columbia law school was 
quoted as saying: “If MetLife was hoping for this to be affirmed, they’ve got to be 
disappointed in this panel.” Id. 
186. John Heltman, FSOC on Chopping Block After Republican Victories, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 9, 2016). 
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discussion, even if the circuit court rules in FSOC’s favor.187 
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